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Framework for a knowledge
economy
What is a knowledge economy? The
knowledge economy could be defined as one
where “comparative advantage [is] much less a
function of natural resource endowments and
capital-labor ratios and much more a function
of technology and skills”.13  Its development is
the product of two forces:  a r ise in the
knowledge intensity of economic activities and
an increasing globalization of economic affairs.
It is driven by the revolution in information and
communications technology, the increasing pace
of technological change and by national and
international deregulation.14
From a policy perspective the knowledge
economy can be seen as consisting of four main
inter-related spheres.15  These are:
• Innovation Systems: R&D, diffusion of
technology, links between science and
industry, firms focusing on new technology,
industry clusters.
• Human Resource Development: basic
education, scientific and engineering talent,
lifelong learning, job training, organiza-
tional learning and innovation.
• Business Environment:  regulatory
environment, intellectual property rights,
competition policy,  tax rates,  physical
infrastructure.
• Information and Communications
Technology (ICT) Infrastructure: invest-
ment in ICT, digital networks, access to and
use of ICT, growth of electronic commerce
and enterprises.
This Monitor focuses on the skill and techno-
logical components of the knowledge economy,
an area where Thailand is low in global
competitiveness rankings.
The most industrialized economies have
addressed many of the fundamental
infrastructure needs of a knowledge-based
economy and are focusing on improving their
innovation systems and promoting the develop-
ment and use of ICT systems and services.
However the situation is less positive in Asian
economies such as Thailand that are at a
relatively early stage in building innovation and
knowledge infrastructures. A recent APEC
report comments, “Along with their marketplace
laws, [they] face the need to build their
economy’s skills base, further modernize their
physical infrastructure and invest in
strengthening their science and technological
capabilities”.16
The ‘knowledge system’ is composed of three
parts;  locally-owned Thai firms (especially
13 L. Thurow. ‘New Tool, New Rules: Playing to win in the new economic game’, Prism.
14 J. Houghton and P. Sheehan. A Primer on the Knowledge Economy, Centre for
Strategic Economic Studies, Victoria University, Melbourne, 2000; Dahlman, C.J and
Aubert, J.-E. China and the Knowledge Economy: Overview, WBI Development
Studies, The World Bank, Washington D.C. (n.d.)
15 APEC, Policies for Promoting the Development of Knowledge-Based Economies.
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THAILAND  ECONOMIC  MONITOR
46
SMEs), multinational or global corporations
(who possess product and process technologies
that are more advanced than the local versions)
and other knowledge institutions such as
schools/universities and government research
institutes.17  Since firms and their workers are
the key components of a knowledge economy
the question is “what actions can governments
take to help firms and workers more effectively
acquire, develop and utilize knowledge”.18
A central problem is that many government
institutions and incentive schemes for industrial
technology and skills upgrading are following
old policy models which focus more on single
entities (whether firms or institutions) than on
knowledge networks, interactions and supply
chains.
Importance of a knowledge
economy for Thailand
The importance of the knowledge economy
for Thailand has been highlighted in the Ninth
Plan. The Thai government’s policies broadly
recognize the importance of improving skills and
technological capability in all economic and
social sectors.19  One specific goal for domestic
markets and rural communities is to “increase
production efficiency by promoting  research and
utilizing local knowledge as well as modern
technological know-how”. For industry, the
policy supports cooperation in research,
technology and product development between
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and
other public and private sector organizations
(including those in higher education). The aim
is to assist Thai firms to obtain technology and
intellectual property from all sources and
ensure a supply of qualified personnel.
But if the will is there, what is the way? What
progress has been made and what challenges lie
ahead in expanding the knowledge base of the
country? How can the government’s goals best
Table 4-1
Rankings of growth competitiveness
component indices
Country Global Technology Public Macroeconomic
comp. Index Rank Institutions Environment
Ranking Index Rank Index Rank
Singapore 4 18 6 1
Korea 23 9 44 8
Malaysia 30 22 39 20
Thailand 33 39 42 16
Philippines 48 40 64 28
Source: World Economic Forum, Global Competitiveness Report 2001
Thailand is placed low in global competitive-
ness rankings. Thailand faces constraints in four
areas:
• Secondary school enrollment rates that
lag behind other countries in the region.
• Skills mix that is not suited to the
emergence of a knowledge economy,
where new industrial and services
companies seek to increase productivity
through technological and organizational
change.
• Technological capability of Thai firms
lags behind other countries in the region.
• Institutions and public programs that have
been less effective than those of other
countries in helping firms to upgrade their
skills development, training, technology
upgrading and ‘knowledge networks’.
be achieved,  given the current range of
government initiatives and the relevant
experience of other industrializing countries?
Recent studies in Thailand have argued for
new ways of ‘thinking about’ industrial
technology policy as it affects knowledge
networks that involve  clusters of innovative
firms and collaboration between the business,
public and education sectors. The studies
identify current barriers preventing knowledge
linkages. They highlight new ways of
formulating and implementing policies that
spread technological capabilities, raise standards
and overcome barriers within firms to
technology upgrading.
17 Paul L. Robertson. Firm-level incentives for research and training in developing
economies, m/s, University of Wollongong, Feb. 2002.
18 Robertson, 2002, op cit.
19 Policy of the Government of H.E. Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra delivered to the
National Assembly on Monday, 26 February 2001 (Unofficial Translation), Section 7.
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Education
The need for skills in the labor force is now
even greater as Thailand’s industrial and
service companies seek to increase
productivity through technological and
org anizational change. Finding ways to
improve the skills of young people and adults in
Thailand is a high priority for improving
competitiveness,  boosting growth, reducing
poverty and raising the quality of life.
Although it is not a focus of this Monitor,
secondary education is the key to skills
development. The limited provision of quality
secondary education is a major bottleneck in
skills development in Thailand. Enrollment rates
in Thailand lag behind Malaysia, Korea and
Philippines.
A recent Bank study on secondary education
identified a number of challenges facing
Thailand.
• Improving quality, efficiency and equity
(priority issues are science, math, IT,
teacher training and creating a learner-
centered approach).
• Financing 12 years of basic education.
• Private and public provision of vocational
education.
Skill development strategies
Thai companies face critical shortages of high
quality engineers and of specific skills like tool
and die making. Thailand is in the process of
formulating a new Skills Development Act and
an associated fund. A December 2001 workshop
on skill development, which was part of the
Country Development Partnership on
Competitiveness, highlighted the lessons
learned in Korea, Malaysia and Singapore in the
management of skill funds, cooperation between
the public and private sectors and cost sharing
arrangements.
Thailand is formulating a new Skill Develop-
ment Act which makes provision for pre-
employment skill training, re-training for job
changes, setting national standards for skills
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and accreditation and tax relief for training
organizations and firms . The law also sets up
a restructured Skill Development Fund (SDF)
to pool government and employers’ contribu-
tions, donor funds and income in order to
provide loans to trainees and training organiz-
ers. Employers will contribute to the SDF only
if they are unable to arrange the necessary
training for themselves. The objective is to
improve both the skills of workers and  trainers,
particularly for in-house training. However
details of the SDF are still being worked out and
will depend on the way it is implemented and
administered.
Experience in Malaysia, Singapore and
elsewhere suggests that successful SDFs share
a range of characteristics .20  Firstly, they are
joint projects bringing together government,
industry and training providers,  sustained by
industry and government funding with very
strong industry involvement in, or control of,
their management. They use a wide range of
training providers: public sector organizations,
in-house trainers,  private trainers and expert
consultants. They tend to provide grants  to the
firms seeking training and loans to the training
providers. The overriding philosophy is one of
‘firms accessing their own contributions’ to the
fund.
The scope of training schemes supported by
funds is also wide, ranging from basic literacy
to technical, craft and managerial skills.
Recognizing that the training ‘industry’ itself
may be weak, a crucial element is support for
the development of training providers:  through
accreditation, promulgation and application of
standards, and financial assistance for training
infrastructure.
A further essential element is the support that
successful SDFs provide; for skills planning, the
development of training strategies within firms,
for cooperation on training between firms and
20 Hong Tan, Do Training Levies Work: Malaysia’s HRDF and Its Effects on Training and
Firm-Level Productivity, Working Paper, World Bank Institute, July 2001; A. Dar, S.;
Canagarajah and P. Murphy, Training Levies: Rationale and Evidence from Evalua-
tions, draft m/s, Nov. 2001; S. Garrett-Jones, Government Incentives for Technologi-
cal Skills Development, paper presented to ‘Skills Development Fund Seminar’, Dept.
of Skill Development, Bangkok, 19 Dec. 200
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Environment:
• Singapore has a sound education system, with a
bias towards early vocational training.
• A range of public and private training providers
operate in a competitive environment.
• A range of human resource development
programs, including through the SDF, are in place.
Skills Development Fund: Financing and
Administration
• The SDF is long-standing: established in 1979
under the National Productivity Board, Ministry
of Trade and Industry.
• The SDF has evolved: originally established with
employer subsidies, moved to planning training
priorities in 1987 and adopted an SME focus in
1992.
• Funded by a 1% employer levy on low-paid,
unskilled workers; at times the levy has been
higher, 2% (initially) and 4%.
• Its budget in 1996-7 was S$86 million.
• Most of its budget comes from industry funding
and interest on invested funds: only 2% is from
government funds (1991 figures). However,
expenditure is currently exceeding the amount
raised from levies; and government ‘tops up’ the
Fund.
• Assistance is provided on a cost sharing principle:
SDF pays 50-80% of costs, employers pay
20-50%.
• It has provided grants for more than 500,000
training places.
• In 1990 30,000 approvals were made; a 90%
success rate.
• It requires prior approval for programs, there is a
2-year wait for reimbursement in some cases.
• Monitoring and evaluation are carried out at three
levels:
• Macro level (skills shortages, redundancies)
• Program level (various performance indicators)
• Firms/trainees (client quality control/tracer
studies)
• The SDF manages a broad portfolio of schemes
and programs.
SDF Schemes & Programs
• Training Grants
• Training Leave (for unskilled mature workers).
• Training Vouchers (all firms are eligible).
• Worker Training Plan (to support training in
firms).
• Training Needs Analysis Consultancy Scheme
(assistance with training strategies for
locally-owned firms).
• Approved-In-Principle Scheme (pre-accredita-
tion of public courses, making it easier for f irms
to use them).
• Emerging/Critical Skills Development Grants
(e.g., in nominated prior ity areas like robotics,
wafer fabrication, health care).
• Basic Education for Skills Training - BEST
(providing fundamental functional literacy/
numeracy to ‘Year 6’ level).
• Worker Improvement Through Secondary
Education - WISE (English, Math).
• Training Infrastructure Development.
• Partnerships with MNCs to set up industry-
specific training centers.
• Financial assistance to trades union groups for
training.
Box 4-1
Skills development incentives in Singapore
within industries,  employer groups and
geographical regions.
The Skills Development Act is a welcome step
but care is required in its implementation.
Comments at the December 2001 workshop
focused on the scope and administration of the
new SDF. Imposing a levy only on firms that
have no training activities would overlook firms
that had the budget but not the expertise to
implement a training strategy. Would it
adequately encourage ‘learning from other
firms’?  For example, would large companies
and MNCs feel themselves ‘outside’ the
scheme and thus be unwilling to assist? Strong
employer representation, including the
establishment of working committee(s) from
particular industrial sectors, was strongly
advocated as a counter to having the fund overly
dominated by the public sector. While integra-
tion of public sector training was seen as highly
desirable (e.g. vocational and university educa-
tion), substantial involvement of the private
sector in training was also seen as essential. It
49
21 Tan and Middleton, op. cit., p. 4.
22 Alice H. Amsden, The Rise of ‘The Rest’: Challenges to the West from Late-Industri-
alizing Economies (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), Table 1.2, p. 4.
23 S. Lall, Learning from the Asian Tigers, London, Macmillan, 1996, p. 29.
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was suggested that the SDF should therefore
provide encouragement for the ‘training service
industry’ to expand its activities and to improve
its quality, ra ther than simply acting as an
industry watchdog. A cautionary note is provided
by Korea,  where an intrusive ‘regulatory’
approach to the eligibility of firm level training
and the application of skills standards failed to
produce any increase in training activity by
firms.21
Technological capability and
innovation within firms is weak
Technological capabilities in firms can be
thought of as three interlocking sets of
competencies: production capability (manage-
ment and engineering), project execution
(feasibility, training, execution) and innovation
capability.22  Put more succinctly these are ‘the
skills, technical knowledge and organizational
coherence required to make industrial technolo-
gies function in an enterprise’.23
Technological capability is perhaps shown best
when firms face the need to innovate, to change
their products, processes or technological
organization. However when it comes to
technological innovation relatively little is
known about the activities or capabilities of Thai
firms. Consequently it is hard for firms and
industries to benchmark themselves against their
competitors in Thailand or elsewhere, or for the
government to formulate policies and measures
to improve the technological capacity of local
firms. So an important first step has been to
gather such information through surveys and
case studies.
Three out of four Thai firms do not engage in
any activities to improve their technological
capability. In 2000, the National Science and
Technology Development Agency (NSTDA) and
the Brooker Group PLC carried out the first
R&D/Innovation Survey of Thailand’s manufac-
turing industry. The survey covered both R&D
Box 4-2
Innovation clusters
Industr ial innovation clusters exist where there is a
loose geographic concentration or association of
firms and other organizations involved in a value
chain, producing goods and services and
innovating. Innovation clusters, particularly in the
knowledge services sector, can be ‘virtual’ rather
than geographically based.
The innovation cluster concept goes beyond
traditional ideas on industry clusters, which involve
horizontal networks of firms focusing on the same
product lines in the same industry sector. It stresses
the advantages of producers, suppliers and support
services from a variety of industries being close to
each other. Thus, innovation clusters are
cross-sectoral, involving dissimilar f irms that
collaborate with each other and with public
‘knowledge institutions’ such as universities and
research laboratories.
Michael Porter uses the term ‘cluster’ in a similar
although more restricted sense to describe formal
cooperative linkages among firms - and between
firms and technology organizations - that result in
business ‘clusters’ that are globally competitive.
The concept of ‘supply chains’ is closer to the
traditional ‘industry cluster’ model (i.e. focused on
a par ticular product and sector), but incorporates
vertical relationships and, increasingly, an
acknowledgment of the importance of sharing
knowledge and learning.
Where innovation clusters have developed their
financial, learning and productivity ‘cultures’  to a
level that supports systemic innovation they can be
regarded as constituting a ‘regional innovation
system’.  An analysis of innovation clusters will
usually reveal the extent to which such
collaborative action has developed in funding,
learning and the production of innovative goods
and services, and the level of support for these goals
in the  commercial and public sectors.
THAILAND  ECONOMIC  MONITOR
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Box 4-3
Scope of innovation activities
• Research and development (R&D).
• Acquisition of machinery, equipment and
software for product and process innovation
(i.e. new or significantly improved products
or processes).
• Acquisition of external technology (e.g.,
patents and licenses) linked to product and
process innovation.
• Industrial design and engineering, market
research and marketing linked to product and
process innovation.
• Training linked directly to product and
process innovation.




(1 – not important, 5 – very important)
Lack of government support 3.6
Perceived cost too high 3.6
Lack of qualified personnel 3.5
Inadequate support services 3.4
Source: Thailand R&D/Innovation Survey 2000
24 Technical Information Access Center, National S&T Development Agency (2000).
Thailand R&D/Innovation Survey – 2000, (Questionnaire); The Brooker Group plc  (2001).
Technological Innovation of Industrial Enterprises in Thailand: Project Synthesis
prepared for the Workshop on ‘Innovation and R&D in Thailand’s Private Sector:
Information and New Findings, June 21, 2001’.
25 Patarapong Intarakumnerd, Pun-arj Chairatana and Tipiwan Tanchipiboon, ‘National
Innovation System in Less Successful Developing Countries: The Case of Thailand’,
m/s submitted to Research Policy, Sept. 2001.
common activity and buying external technol-
ogy the least common. The main reasons for
innovation were reported as a) to improve
product quality; b) to reduce production costs/
improve yield and c) to expand product ranges
and markets. Factors limiting innovation were
also canvassed. The survey also found that
innovating firms saw it as important to use their
parent and associated overseas  companies and
their foreign-owned suppliers as collaborators
and sources of information on innovation.
Technology and innovative capabilities in
Thailand lag behind comparable Asian
countries .  The government policies and
institutional framework supporting technologi-
cal development in Thai firms have recently been
activities to improve their technological
capability in the preceding three years24 (not even
employee training or the acquisition of machin-
ery to improve production processes). Most of
the firms carried out only simple testing and
quality control,  fewer than half had a design
capability and only one-third a capacity for
reverse engineering.25
R & D is concentrated in a few sectors.
Research is perhaps the most skill-intensive
driver of innovation and the survey showed it
was clearly a minority activity. Fewer than one
in six firms said they had carried out R&D in
the last three years. Firms spent Baht 1,350 mil-
lion on R&D in 1999, with companies in the
food, beverages and tobacco industry carrying
out around 48 percent of the total,  and firms in
the fabricated metals, machinery and equipment
sector performing a further 35 percent. Nearly
1,100 research personnel were employed. The
survey shows that R&D activities are
concentrated in a few sectors but, at least in the
case of the food industry, ones not regarded
internationally as sectors of ‘high R&D
intensity’.
Strong linkages between local and foreign
firms support innovation. Expenditure by firms
on innovation activities other than R&D totalled
Baht 2,084 million in 1999, or about 1.5 times
the expenditure on R&D, again concentrated in
the same two industry sectors. Acquisition of
machinery and equipment was the most
and other innovation activities, including
training and market research,  for the three years
1997-1999. A total of 1,019 firms responded to
the survey (including the 200 largest firms in
Thailand). Of these 154 (or 15.1 percent)
reported carrying out R&D, while 223 (21.9
percent) reported carrying out other innovation
activities. In other words, more than three out
of four firms responding had not engaged in any
51
26 E. Arnold, M. Bell, J. Bessant and P. Brimble. Enhancing Policy and Institutional
Support for Industrial Technology Development in Thailand: The Overall Policy
Framework and the Development of an Industrial Innovation System, Technopolis,
SPRU, CENTRIM and Brooker Group plc, December 2000.
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reviewed with the support of the World Bank.26
The study found that technology and innovative
capabilities in Thailand lagged far behind
comparable Asian countries. For example, the
current level of R&D among business enterprises
in Thailand is around 10-15 years behind the
level in Korea in the early 1980s when that
country had a level of industrial and manufac-
turing development similar to that in Thailand
today. The intensity of R&D in business in
Thailand would need to increase to around 20
times its present level in order to ‘catch up’ with
the level in Korea at its corresponding earlier
stage of industrial development.
The most important thresholds of
technological capability that firms need to
cross are not concerned with formally organized
R&D but with other technological development
and learning activities:
• For larger firms, they are about building
design and engineering capabilities as a
starting point for significant technology
development activities.
• For the majority of SMEs, especially in
traditional industries, they are about in-
creasing the efficiency with which exist-
ing technologies are acquired, used and
operated.
Public policy and institutional
framework for innovation must
change
The common finding of recent studies is that
most Thai firms do not have the resources
they need to upgrade their process and
product technologies. In particular SMEs (the
backbone of most economies, whether develop-
ing or developed) lack both the knowledge
required to make informed decisions and the
financial resources to acquire that knowledge
and to  invest in new technologies once they have
decided on a reasonable strategy. In countries
with relatively low per capita incomes, govern-
ments offer the best (and perhaps the most
equitable) prospects for providing the funds
needed to surmount these barriers.
Public institutions are viewed as weak and
ineffective by firms. In the 2001 innovation
survey companies were also asked about their
knowledge and use of government support and
funding and which services and incentives they
had used. Firms rated the availability of
government incentives for innovation as weak
and requested the provision of better informa-
tion on innovation, better human resource
development and financial incentives for R&D
and innovation. Firms that used public services
valued the information, technical and training
services provided by the government more
highly than the monetary incentives, which were
not used extensively by the firms sampled.
University laboratory services were also well
used.
Supply side driven technology development
will need to be changed. The Technopolis study
was strongly critical of a ‘supply side’ approach
to technology development in Thailand and
argued for giving end-users more influence over
government sponsored technology development.
It saw current policy and institutional arrange-
ments as ‘mono-structural’, favoring public and
semi-public institutions at the expense of
building up technology development capabili-
ties within industrial firms. This finding has clear
implications for future policy.
The nexus between universities and the
private sector. In 2002 Thai public universities
are expected to achieve greater management
autonomy while being required to generate more
income from the business sector. This should
prompt growth in university-industry collabo-
rative R&D, training and service activities.
Policy reforms, funding arrangements and
the organization of technical support
institutes would build technological
capability . There is a need for more specializa-
THAILAND  ECONOMIC  MONITOR
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Scheme
BOI promotion for R&D activities Promotion of R&D as:
(a) R&D activities already included in a promoted investment project
(b) R&D as an addition to an already promoted investment project.
(c) activities separate from firm’s other business activities
Depreciation allowances for Depreciation rate raised to 40% from 20%
machinery and equipment for R&D
200 percent tax concession 200% deduction for R&D expenditure
Deduction or exemption from
R&D machinery import duties
Research and Technology R&D soft loans Baht 10-20 million per project
Development Fund (MOSTE)
Company Directed Technology Development Program
Innovation Development Fund Grants and soft loans for business innovation and start-ups
Thai Research Fund R&D Grants Science and technology for production, marketing and services
Industrial R&D for production processes and product development
MOI Productivity Improvement Plan Soft loans for improving productivity and upgrading machinery
NSTDA Industrial Consultancy Service Provides up to 75% of consultancy costs
Support for Technology Acquisition and Financial support and arrangement of factory visits
Mastery Program (STAMP)
BOI Unit for Industrial Linkages Development
Skills development: 150 percent tax concession for
training expenditure
Source: Garrett-Jones, Robertson, Turpin, and Charoenpanji (2002)
Table 4-2
Financial Incentives for R&D and innovation activities in Thailand
53
Objective Mechanism Target
Promote firm-based R&D Taxation concessions Firm located in any zone involved with R&D activities
Encourage firm-based R&D Taxation concessions Firms engaged with R&D
Encourage firm-based R&D Taxation concessions Firms conducting R&D or hired to do R&D.
They must be approved by MOF. NSTDA is the certifying body.
Encourage technology acquisition Taxation concessions Firms importing specific types of machinery: esp. scientific tools,
R&D testing equipment, electronics parts and computer parts
Soft loans to improve and develop Loans General
production processes and invest
in R&D results
Assist SMEs to invest Loans and grants  SMEs
in technology development
Grants and soft loans for strategic projects Grants and loans General
Raising levels of R&D to develop Grant SMEs
processes and products
Improving f irms’ machinery and productivity Loans SMEs
Enhancing production capability Subsidies SMEs
in SMEs through the use of consultants
Support for technology acquisition Subsidies SMEs
Improving linkages between manufacturers
and local suppliers
Encourage private sector to invest in training Levies Firms that don’t conduct training themselves
STRENGTHENING  THE  KNOWLEDGE  ECONOMY
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Assistance Benefits Possible Constraints Budgetary/Administrative/Legal
Measure Issues
Tax Non-discriminatory: open No benefit to Cost is open-ended (difficult to
concessions to all firms that meet unprofitable/start-up control the level of revenue
stated criteria. firms. foregone).
Businesses more likely to Subsidizes ‘existing’ Relatively simple administration.
be aware of taxation activities that would have
benefits. occurred anyway (unless Does not require annual approval of
based on incremental budget.
‘Arm’s length’ performance, which is
instrument: activities hard to police). Usually requires changes to taxation
chosen by industry. legislation.
Abuse (e.g., ‘double
Maintenance of firm dipping’ when f irms are also Requires careful accounting of
confidentiality. eligible for loans or grants). eligible costs within the firm.
Speedy processing (when Selection criteria may Problems of definition and legal
approval ‘automatic’). encourage risk-averse activities interpretation.
to achieve short term
repayment.
Repayable Can be targeted widely or Less likely to subsidize Maximum cost can be set but actual
loans focused on specific activities. activities that would cost hard to determine.
occur anyway.
Priorities or scope (type, Requires annual budget.
timing, size) set by govt., Formal application may
specific proposals made be required. Requires formal procedure for
by firms. application and selection.
Cumbersome and lengthy
selection procedure. Difficult to decide what constitutes a
successful outcome for the purpose
of repayment – clear criteria
required.
Grants Generally for specific Less likely to subsidize Annual cost is set.
activities. Priorities or activities that would
scope set by govt., occur anyway. Requires clear criteria for selection
specific proposals made and the evaluation of outcomes.
by firms. Formal application
required. Cumbersome Requires formal procedure for
and lengthy selection application and selection.
procedure.
Source: Garrett-Jones, Robertson, Turpin, and Charoenpanji (2002)
Table 4-3
Administrative benefits and constraints on different forms of financial incentive for research
and technology development
55
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Figure 4-1
Industrial technology development policy
in Thailand: alternative strategy – policy
emphasis
















tion by institutions (including both integrating
and separating current functions), more
competition between institutions to encourage
rationalization (e.g. between NSTDA’s national
institutes and the universities), greater stake-
holder involvement (government and industry)
in decision making and priority setting, and
performance-linked financing. For example a
key part of NSTDA’s mandate is to foster
industrial development. However industry plays
a surprisingly small part in the governance of
NSTDA. NSTDA has a range of support
instruments to help develop technological
capabilities but these are not widely deployed
and do not interact much with NSTDA’s main
research activities.
Agencies like NSTDA could consider shifting
the focus of their activities from developing
public research capabilities to fostering
technological capabilities in industry. This
would require changes in governance, manage-
ment and strategy development in NSTDA.
Changes in focus would also be necessary. These
include separating policy-making and policy/
program implementation, adopting  formal goal
setting, performance measurement and
reporting of achievements and increased
mobility of personnel between NSTDA, the
universities and industry.
There is a strong consensus among analysts
that it is time for a change of direction on the
part of NSTDA and other technology
agencies . The important 10-year phase of
building up the public research and technology
infrastructure must now lead on to the crucial
‘second step’ – that of working directly with
industrial ‘customers’ and with groups of
players in the knowledge economy.  This
represents a significant change of emphasis in
government programs.
Knowledge networking
There is a growing recognition of the
important role of ‘knowledge networks’ in
driving  innovation (rather than the catalyst
being technology alone). Other important
factors are the importance of clustering in
industries to support smaller firms in skill
development and the  collective acquisition and
distribution of technology; a reliance on
knowledge intensity rather than capital or labor
intensity; the need to link local, national and
international knowledge and innovation
systems rather than focusing on developing an
isolated national system. The implication is that
future government policies should support
knowledge networking as a means of improv-
ing the capability of firms in an equitable
manner.
Linkages between the ‘knowledge actors’
(local and multi-national firms, technology
institutes,  universities) within Thailand’s
innovation system appear generally weak and
fragmentary. The result of this is weak links
between users and producers, limited
intra-sectoral cooperation, limited technology
spillover from MNCs and poorly developed,
short-term relationships between firms,
universities and technology institutes.27  For
example, in the 2000 innovation survey fewer
than one in five firms reported having used the
services of the government research and
technology  organizations.
Past studies have supported incentives that
promote collaboration between universities and
industry, with the dual aims of stimulating world
27  Patarapong Intarakumnerd et al. op cit.
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Since Malaysia achieved independence in the 1960’s the role of technology in development policy has evolved
greatly. In particular in the mid-1980s the government embarked on a large-scale program to promote
industrialization through technological development in targeted industries. As a result of dissatisfaction with
the failure of investments by MNCs to provide substantial spillovers at that time, public R&D expenditures
were centralized in the Fifth Malaysia Plan of 1986-90 and the Intensification of Research in Priority Areas
program of 1986. Increased private sector input was provided as a result of the Action Plan for Industrial
Technology Development (1990).
Although government spending on R&D more than doubled between 1986 and 1995 and public sector
technology institutes expanded greatly, a feeling arose that activities had become excessively centralized and
bureaucratized and that, as a result, they were not sufficiently efficient in meeting industrial needs. To
counteract these tendencies and to harness technological dynamism in the private sector government policy
followed a new direction after 1993. In order to encourage the creation of industrial clusters the Malaysian
government increasingly sought spillovers from MNCs operating locally. In a policy similar to Singapore’s,
the government has tried to promote technological advances in indigenous firms that belong to subcontract-
ing networks centered on foreign firms (largely from Japan or East Asian NICs) with manufacturing
operations in Malaysia. Through keitretsu-like structures small local firms are meant to get the resources to
upgrade their technological skills and reduce Malaysia’s high level of dependence on labor-intensive
operations. A cluster in Penang, built around disk-drive firms that had migrated from Singapore, has been
viewed as especially successful. A more recent phenomenon, the Multimedia Super Corridor, is currently
receiving a large amount of funding from the Malaysian government to create another private-public cluster.
However despite this partial shift in emphasis to technology transfer within the private sector, two prominent
observers (Felker with Jomo, 1999, 24) have argued that;
“In sum, though industrial and  technology  policies  have gradually
shifted from expansive  aspirations to  strategically  direct  structural
change to a model more  focused on  private-sector  dynamics and
institutions, the Malaysian state retains its activist stance in fostering
technological upgrading. It continues to emphasize strategic interven-
tion, if increasingly in a supportive and facilitating role”.
Although it is too early to evaluate these initiatives fully, there are concerns that,  in reality, the spillovers from
MNCs to indigenous firms are less than had been hoped. Moreover, the lack of local skilled and educated
labor may inhibit further rapid development if MNCs capture the bulk of the skilled workforce, so leaving
locally-based firms that wish to participate in technological upgrading at a disadvantage. This situation had
led to calls for immediate and substantial growth in the infrastructure devoted to training and education.
Box 4-5
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class research and doctoral level training and
encouraging ‘people-focused’ (rather than
equipment focused) technology link-ups
between technology institutes and industrial
enterprises.
Potential locations for such collaboration
already exist. In the Chiang Mai area a number
of service providers (government agencies,
universities and technology institutes) cater to
SMEs in the local ceramics industry. However
their relationship appears to be short term and
ad hoc rather than systematically supporting a
strategy for building the technological capability
required for higher quality and higher priced
products. An effective example of collaboration
is that between King Mongkut’s Institute of
Technolog y in Bangkok and the Hi-Tech
Industrial Estate, which has led to the setting up
of the Ayutthaya Technical Training Centre.
Potential collaborative clusters may also be
found in the supply chains of manufacturing
MNCs. In the automotive industry MNCs like
Toyota have significant in-country R&D and
technological skills which can be used to
support their Tier 1 and Tier 2 (primarily local)
suppliers. The activities of semi-public agencies
like the Thailand Automotive Institute (in
information, training, quality certification and
testing) can also play an important role.
However, a recent analysis of the Thai automo-
tive industry identified a lack of collaborative
mechanisms within the supply chain, in
addition to the common problems of a shallow
skills base and inadequate support services.28
Communication within the supply chain was
largely informal, making little use of ICT-based
systems. The challenges facing the automotive
sector at the Tier 2 level concern the interaction
of technology/skills development, trade policy,
investment policy and SME development. As is
the case in other sectors these problems cut
across several government. agencies, including
NSTDA and the Ministries of Industry and
Labor.
28 World Bank Group, SME Global Product Group/East Asia and Pacific Private Sector
Development, Supply Chain Deepening in the Thai Automotive Sector: Analysis of
Key Issues-Pilot Program Design, December 2001.
There is no single focal point within
government with responsibility for producing
a coherent sectoral strategy or coordinating
the government’s response to the technical
and policy needs of the sector. In such
industries the technological needs will be almost
wholly determined by the MNCs. But public-
private sector cooperation is also required to
assist the local companies in building their
capability to serve MNCs with technology-based
products of the required quality and price.
Conclusion
Thailand ranks low in global rankings of
technological and skills capability despite the
large number of public institutes that have been
established to support science, technology and
labor skills. It is estimated that at least 17
public organizations or funds exist to support
technology and innovations. Most of these
programs suffer from a lack of targeting. There
is a lack of coordination amongst agencies, and
many of the programs are supply driven. The
programs on technological development are not
well coordinated with those for skills develop-
ment. Along with institutional deficiencies the
instruments used to deliver the services (e.g.,
taxes and subsidies) are also ineffective.
Thailand will need to consider the following to
improve its technological and skills develop-
ment.
• Improve targeting (e.g., by reaching out
not only to firms but also to networks,
targeting SMEs).
• Improve coordination across agencies.
• Improve governance of these agencies by
giving a greater voice to SMEs on the
boards of management.
• Increase awareness.
• Integrate technological and skills
development.
